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Abstract Is the success of the Chinese in so many domains all over the world
evidence that they are cosmopolitan “citizens of the world,” at home in different
environments, able to negotiate all the cultural complexities of a globalizing world?
Have Confucian cultures become “cosmopolitan cultures”? The revival of Confu-
cianism in the People’s Republic of China has been associated with cultural
nationalism, while others argue for cosmopolitan interpretations of Confucianism.
Philosophically, Confucianism is incompatible with a certain well-known liberal
conception of cosmopolitanism emphasizing impartiality and individual equality,
but the early Confucian texts have resources that could contribute to contemporary
moral response to cultural diversity. This paper explores the relationship between
Confucianism and cosmopolitanism from a different angle by asking how Chinese
diasporic communities reconcile the different demands of loyalty to ancestral cul-
ture, of cultural identity, with those of living among people of other cultures;
making a living and sometimes making a fortune in today’s global capitalist
economies; being mobile in a way that their ancestors could not even imagine; and
thereby having access to more of the world than Diogenes could even dream of
when he coined the term “kosmopolitês.” It argues that there is a need to go beyond
philosophical reconciliation, for more interdisciplinary studies of Confucian cul-
tures in diasporic communities and networks, for the actual experience of these
communities and networks in negotiating between cosmopolitan trends and aspi-
rations on the one hand, and ethnocentric biases and prejudices on the other,
provides better understanding of what Confucianism could contribute to contem-
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In every major cities, on every continent, in remote corners of the earth, there are
Chinese communities. Chinese entrepreneurs and professionals form transnational
networks of “flexible citizens,” sometimes portrayed as sharing—besides language,
ethnicity, and more or less real kinship affiliations—a set of Confucian-inspired values
that give them a comparative advantage in the processes of global capitalism.1 Is the
success of the Chinese in so many domains all over the world evidence that they are
cosmopolitan “citizens of the world,” at home in different environments, able to
negotiate all the cultural complexities of a globalizing world? Have Confucian cultures
become“cosmopolitan cultures”?The revival ofConfucianism in thePeople’sRepublic
of China has been associated with cultural nationalism (Kang 2008), while Bell (2009)
argues that Confucian nationalism, locating allegiance to the nation-state between
family bonds and global ethical concern in Confucian “gradated” love, provides an
antidote to popular xenophobic nationalism that raises the nation-state above all. Critics
of nationalism have used cosmopolitan interpretations of Confucianism, often citing the
ethical goal of “bringing peace to the world” from the “Great Learning” chapter of the
Record of Rites (Liji) to resist such association, while others argue that Confucian
concern for “all under heaven” (tianxia) has a very different perspective of persons and
their relationship to the world when compared with cosmopolitanism, commonly
understood as rejecting particularistic attachments and treating everyone equally,
regardless of nationality or any other particular identities and relationships to oneself.
Philosophically, Confucianism is incompatible with a certain well-known
conception of cosmopolitanism, as Ivanhoe (2014, p. 27) has shown in his criticism
of Martha Nussbaum’s liberal cosmopolitanism as a moral principle that views moral
agents as first and foremost moral individuals, who “owe deep allegiance to no
particular people, places, religions, cultures, or states; their ultimate and overriding
allegiance is to what is right, with right understood in terms of the duties appropriate
for a particular type of Kantian moral agent.” However, he identifies a second
conception of cosmopolitanism that is about moral response to cultural diversity in
Nussbaum’s call for multicultural education. Ivanhoe argues that the two conceptions
do not fit well together and Nussbaum’s desired cosmopolitan education is better
supported by two alternative versions of cosmopolitanism, which he develops from
two passages in the Analects. Ivanhoe (2014, p. 34) proposes a Confucian
cosmopolitanism in which “the cosmopolitan is not a citizen of nowhere but an
interested guest or visitor of various cultures and ways of life who is comfortable
around the world.” Neville (2012) has drawn on the resources of early Confucian texts
to articulate five dimensions of contemporary cosmopolitanism—in decision making,
engaging others, attaining personal wholeness, the ultimate value-identity of life, and
religious sensibility—thus offering us a contemporary Confucian cosmopolitanism.
1 Ong (1999), Weidenbaum (1996), Callahan (2002). As early as 1979, Kahn (1979) suggested a
connection between Confucian values and economic development; see also MacFarquhar (1980, pp. 67–
72). For a skeptical view of Confucianism’s supposed positive distinctive role in capitalism, see Yao (1996).
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Besides these philosophical attempts to develop Confucian cosmopolitanism, Zhao
Tingyang proposes a new approach in international relations based on the concept of
tianxia found in the Confucian ideal of “bringing peace to the world”—the tianxia
system provides a model to address problems of world politics from a world
perspective rather than the current nation-states based international system (Zhao
2005, 2009. Cf. Gan 2012; Xu 2012).
This paper explores the relationship between Confucianism and cosmopolitanism
from a different angle by asking how Chinese diasporic communities reconcile the
different demands of loyalty to ancestral culture, of cultural identity, with those of living
among people of other cultures; making a living and sometimes making a fortune in
today’s global capitalist economies; beingmobile in a way that their ancestors could not
even imagine; and thereby having access tomore of theworld thanDiogenes could even
dream of when he coined the term “kosmopolitês.” A brief survey of the history of
cosmopolitanism in Europe and North America reveals that cosmopolitan aspirations
and ethnocentric prejudices have existed in parallel even in societies where
cosmopolitan philosophy is explicitly espoused. While Confucian philosophy might
have cosmopolitan potential, there is also historical evidence of parochialism and
ethnocentrism in Chinese societies, and even in Confucian texts. Beyond philosophical
reconciliation at purely conceptual level, the project of Confucian cosmopolitanism has
a better chanceof livingup to the pragmatic aspirations inherent inConfucianism, that is,
making a real difference in the world of concrete experience, if the inquiry takes a more
inter-disciplinary approach to study Confucian cultures in diasporic communities and
networks. These communities and networks have actual experience of negotiating
between cosmopolitan trends and aspirations on the one hand and ethnocentric biases
and prejudices on the other. This paper lays the philosophical foundations for such inter-
disciplinary studies to achieve better understanding of what Confucianism could
contribute to contemporary cosmopolitanism and the potential of Confucianism
transforming global capitalism. Within the conceptual framework of a Confucian
cosmopolitanism that eschews one-sided universalism, which almost inevitably falls
prey to ethnocentric conceptions, in favor of a balance between universality and
particularity that focuses on specific practices in particular contexts in order to achieve
cosmopolitan inclusiveness through the local and immediate, it proposes understanding
cosmopolitanism in terms of local and immediate cultural practices, and considers the
relevance of Confucian rituals (li禮)—the central means of creating and maintaining
solidarity in Confucian communities—to the creating of cosmopolitan cultures.
Confucianism and Chineseness
According to Tu (1989, p. 6), “If the English speaking community were to choose
one word to characterize the Chinese way of life for the last two thousand years,
the word would be ‘Confucian.’”2 He believes that Confucianism is a permanent
2 Popular works on “Chinese culture” regularly includes Confucianism, and scholarly reiteration of this
may be found in Fung Yu-lan’s response at the Columbia University Convocation in his honor on 10
September 1982, in the Proceedings of the Heyman Center. This was also taken for granted by Qian Mu,
Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan and Mou Zongsan (Chang 1976).
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part of the “psycho-cultural construct of the contemporary Chinese intellectual as
well as the Chinese peasant” (Tu 1984, p. 80, 1989, p. 38). Yet, the relationship
between Confucianism and “Chineseness” has been tenuous. Historically, Confu-
cianism did not remain merely “Chinese”—if by that we mean the people who
originate in what is today known as mainland China—and only ethnocentric
prejudice could deny Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese Confucianisms their own
cultural distinctiveness. If the Mongol and Manchu invaders became “Chinese” in
the process of becoming “Confucian,” then their very transformation also changed
the very meaning of “Chineseness.” In the world of fashion, the cheongsam has
been culturally identified as “Chinese”; in fact, it is the traditional dress of the
Manchus. Travelers from mainland China often find the “Chinese” food in
Southeast Asia not to their taste because Malay, Indian, and other influences have
transformed (and we would argue greatly enriched) the “Chinese” cuisine in those
communities. Insofar as other East Asians have become Confucian voluntarily,
they do not simply copy every Confucian practice from the Chinese, but rather
practice Confucianism in ways adapted to their own local conditions. They
certainly do not become “Chinese” just because they have become Confucian.
Within China itself, Confucianism has also been only one among many
components that constitute “Chinese culture.” In different regions of China,
Confucian teachings and practices interact with local conditions and other
prevailing beliefs and customs to yield different forms of practices which were
Confucian in origin or intent, but not always identified as such. In a different form
of adaptation, Confucian philosophy has transformed itself to meet the challenges
of Daoism and Buddhism, sometimes by incorporating elements from these rivals.
This has led contemporary scholars to compare the adaptation of Confucianism
confronted by the challenges of Western modernity in the last two centuries with
those earlier successful adaptations.3
In the twentieth century, Confucianism has not always been considered an
essential part of being Chinese. Inspired by Enlightenment thought, May Fourth
intellectuals rejected Chinese traditional culture, especially Confucianism, in favor
of science and democracy in their iconoclastic quest for a new culture. Chinese
nationalists from 1925 to the mid-1950s marginalized Confucianism and the
Cultural Revolution of the Mao era attacked Confucianism (Wang 1996, p. 7). The
early years of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were not without its own strand of
iconoclasm. In an argument reminiscent of the May Fourth movement, the 1988
television mini-series, River Elegy (Heshang 河殤), portrayed Chinese culture as
tyrannical and confining; it recommended that the Chinese move in the direction of
modernization, democratization, and globalization (Su 1992). The River Elegy was
the center-piece of the “cultural fever” (wenhua re 文化熱) in China during the
1980s as a controversy arose about the comparative merits of Western modernism
and Chinese traditional culture to China’s modernization.
3 This is the import of Tu Wei-ming’s “third epoch of Confucian humanism,” and before him Mou
Zongsan’s “third wave Confucianism.”
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The contrast between the People’s Republic of China and the “outside world” at
the end of the 1970s presented Chinese intellectuals with a “cultural dilemma: either
attempt to modernize China in line with the outside world or endeavor to preserve
the cultural traditions that had been the very basis for Chinese cultural pride” (Song
2003, p. 82). Chinese scholars turned their attention to Confucianism, which was
singled out in the culturalist explanation of the capitalist successes of East Asian
economies of Japan and the four little “dragons” in Asia (Taiwan, South Korea,
Hong Kong, and Singapore).4 It was during this “cultural fever” that Tu Wei-ming
visited Beijing in 1985, an event regarded as the beginning of “the return of New
Confucianism to its homeland” (Song 2003, p. 85). With the help of Confucian
scholars from overseas, mainland China has been reconstructing the Confucian ideal
to meet its political and cultural needs. The “culture fever” laid the groundwork for
the “national studies craze” (guoxue re 國學熱) of the subsequent decade,
Confucianism is a key part of what is considered “national studies.” As impressive
economic achievements encouraged the Chinese to recover their sense of cultural
pride if not superiority, Confucianism is a prominent presence in the rising cultural
nationalism in the People’s Republic of China (Zheng 1999, pp. 67–81; see also
Chen 1997; Xiao 1994). Many recognize that, if Confucianism has a permanent
place in Chinese culture, its practical and philosophical reconciliation with China’s
current modernization and the trends of globalization must certainly shape China’s
future and transform Confucianism as well.
The sometimes xenophobic outpourings of nationalist sentiments in mainland
China may fuel fears of the “clash of civilization” made famous by Samuel
Huntington. There is no need to add to the many critiques of Huntington’s thesis.
The diversity of Chinese culture, or rather Chinese cultures, and their loose
affiliation with Confucianism; the diversity of Confucianisms and the dispersed
Confucian communities living in far apart territories with very different historical
and geopolitical interests, cast doubt on Huntington’s fear about a “Confucian
civilization” ranging itself against “the West” (which is itself an abstraction of
academic discourse). Rather than geopolitics on a civilizational scale, a study of
what remains of “Confucian culture” in the Chinese diaspora could help us
understand and thereby improve social interaction at the day to day level of peoples
of different cultures living in close proximity as a result of the demands
globalization impose on communities and organizations, as well as individuals.
Cultures play a part in the tensions between cohesion and conflict. Such a study
seeks a better understanding of how to balance the need for intra-group unity and
identification with the demands of inter-group interaction in increasingly complex
social processes of the new globalizing age. In the case of Confucianism, to what
extent does it still serve as the cultural marker of the “Chinese”? Does Confucian
culture facilitate or obstruct cosmopolitanism? As the background for the empirical
study to answer these questions, the next section will examine the philosophical
obstacles and resources for reconciling Confucianism and cosmopolitanism.
4 This “post-Confucian” thesis (Kahn 1979) inspired a series of works elaborating it.
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Chinese and barbarians in Confucian texts
Despite its very extensive diaspora, the Chinese for a long time had an aversion to
travelling abroad, let alone more permanent migration. For long periods of its
history, China was “earthbound” in the sense that “Chinese who went overseas may
be seen as atypical, if not downright un-Chinese” (Wang 2000, p. 3). Between 1370s
and 1893, Chinese who left China’s shores without approved reason were treated as
criminals upon their return. Even after the ban on foreign travel was lifted, the
assumption was that Chinese migrants living abroad were “sojourners” (huaqiao華
僑) who would eventually return to China. Even when return became impossible or
no longer desirable, compared to other migrants they gave the impression of being
more resistant to assimilation into the dominant cultures of the places they had
settled, although whether or not any Chinese community outside China was able to
maintain its “Chinese” identity and gain recognition as a separate group also depend
on the politics of the country it is located in, the politics in China and the relations
between the community and its host country with China. Besides the difficulties and
perils of travel and a “continental mindset” arising from China’s geopolitical
situation for much of China’s history, the Chinese aversion to venturing too far from
home could also be partly blamed on its Confucian legacy.5
The Master said, “When your parents are alive, do not journey far, and when
you do travel, be sure to have a specific destination.”6
To fulfill his filial responsibility, a virtuous Confucian would stay close to home to
take care of his parents on a daily basis, and any unavoidable travel should be
undertaken with very specific destinations so that the traveler could be contacted if
necessary; and travel should be limited to trips short enough for him to return in
time for his parents’ funeral should the unfortunate need arose. This is not itself a
complete embargo on travel abroad even when parents are alive, and poses no limit
after one’s parents have passed away. Confucius himself travelled more than most
of his contemporaries, spending more than a decade (497–484 BCE) outside his home
state of Lu (in present day Shandong province). Unsuccessful in persuading the ruler
of Lu to adopt his advice in governing, Confucius sought to put his philosophy into
practice elsewhere. He served in the states of Wei and Chen, passed through the
state of Song and also visited the state of Cai.7 One might compare Confucius to
present-day foreign guest workers or global talents whose employment takes them
away from their home country for long periods of time; or perhaps even more
tempting a comparison would be with various missionaries, since for Confucius, it
was not so much a matter of seeking better economic opportunities—making a
(better) living for self and family—but pursuing an arguably grander mission of
setting the world on the right path. Far from being parochial, Confucian philosophy
5 For discussion of China’s “continental mindset” and its influence on Chinese migration and China’s
relations with South East Asia, see Wang (2000, chap. 1).
6 Analects 4.19. Unless otherwise stated, citations from The Analects are from Ames and Rosemont
(1998).
7 See “Events in the Life of Confucius” in Lau (1979, pp. 170–177).
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could be considered expansive in extending its quest of personal-cultivation through
ordering families, to governing states well, all the way to bringing peace to all under
heaven (tianxia天下). In not being confined spatially or even temporally, one might
characterize the Confucian moral vision as cosmopolitan.
While Confucius’ actual travels were confined to the “Chinese states” on the
central plains between the River Yangtze and the Yellow River, traditionally known
as zhu xia 諸夏, he did think of venturing further, beyond the borders of the
civilized world as he knew it.
The Master wanted to go and live amongst the nine clans of the Eastern Yi [夷]
Barbarians. Someone said to him, “What would you do about their
crudeness?”
The Master replied, “Were an exemplary person (junzi 君子) to live among
them, what crudeness could there be?” (Analects 9.14)
Although a Korean friend once suggested that the last line of the above passage
should be read as affirming that the land of the Eastern Yi (somewhere in today’s
Korean peninsula) was populated with exemplary persons and so there was no
crudeness to worry any visitor, it is more likely that the speaker was expressing the
common deprecatory prejudice against those living outside the central plains.
Confucius could be read as sharing this prejudice up to a point, or at least he did not
think it necessary to criticize its bias. However, instead of allowing that to be a
reason to avoid foreign lands, he believed that the exemplary person could and
should transform barbarians were he to live among them. The same sense of cultural
superiority is evident in Confucius’ remark in another Analects passage implying
that the non-Chinese tribes were comparatively inferior.8
The Master said, “The Yi and Di [夷狄] barbarian tribes with rulers are not as
viable as the various Chinese states [諸夏] without them.” (Analects 3.5)
Insofar as Confucius believed himself to be the bearer of a moral mission, it should
be carried out in all places under heaven. While there is a danger that sojourning
among barbarians might erode one’s virtue, if one could persevere in one’s virtuous
practice and continue to follow the way as an exemplary person should, then such
exemplary behavior would lead the barbarians toward the Confucian way of
personal cultivation and harmonious community based on virtue.
This attitude could be akin to Europeans colonizing other parts of the world
professing to “civilize the natives.” It is not difficult to find ethnocentrism in the
long and complex history of the Confucian tradition. After Confucius, Mencius
responded that he “had heard of the Chinese converting barbarians to their ways, but
not of their being converted to barbarian ways,” when some people expressed an
interest in the teachings of Xu Xing, a man from what was presumably considered
8 The “distinction between Chinese and barbarian” (yi xia zhi bian 夷夏之辩) became a central issue
later in the tradition and its ethnocentrism sometimes descended into xenophobia. For more detailed
discussion of the “ethnocentric currents” in Confucianism, see Tan (2005a, pp. 437–39).
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“barbarian” region in the south (Lau 1984, 3A4). Tang dynasty Confucian Han Yu
(786–824) also rejected Buddhism for being “a cult of the barbarian people.”9
Mencius in the same passage referred to Xu Xing as “the southern barbarian with
the twittering tongue.” This disparaging comparison of foreigners to birds or beasts,
thereby casting doubt on their humanity is also very evident in Han Yu’s writings:
“Make humans of [the barbarians], burn their books, make homes of their dwellings,
make clear the ways of the former kings to guide them,” for “humans are the
masters of barbarians and beasts.”10 Han Yu at least encouraged the Chinese to treat
both barbarians and beasts benevolently. During the transition from the Ming to the
Qing dynasty, when China was conquered by barbarians, Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692)
completely abandoned Confucius’ teachings that one must maintain the standards of
an exemplary person even when living among barbarians. For Wang, “it would not
be dishonest to deceive them, nor inhumane to kill them, nor ethically wrong to rob
them.”11 Such ethnocentric strands in the tradition certainly point to a less than
cosmopolitan worldview. However, in this respect—where cosmopolitanism co-
exists or is even closely intertwined with ethnocentrism—there is more similarity
than differences between China and Western societies. Although cosmopolitanism
originated in ancient Greece and received significant attention and development in
the history of European thought, European countries historically has not been free
from the taint of ethnocentrism either. The next section will examine briefly the
tenuous relationship between cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism in European
history of philosophy and contemporary efforts to address the problem.
Western cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism
When asked, “Where are you from?” Diogenes the Cynic (ca. 412–323 BC) was
reputed to have answered, “kosmopolitês,” thus inventing a term which has been
translated into “cosmopolitan” or “world-citizen” in English. In ancient Greece
where the concept was born, the citizen is member of a polis, a city-state, which
defines at least in part his identity, and demands his entire allegiance. Diogenes’s
new term takes the citizen out of the city, and expands his horizon to encompass the
world. However, the equating of Kosmo with “world” is problematic. There is some
question as to when the term came to mean the universe, and even then it was
distinguished and even contrasted with, rather than included, the earth. It is also
possible that during Diogenes time, “kosmopolitês” might mean instead “citizen of
an ordered city”—in that case, it is advocating that one’s allegiance should be to an
ideal order rather than any physical city or actual political entity. In ancient Greece,
Cynic cosmopolitanism is part of a personal ethic directed towards the pursuit of
9 “Memorial on the Bone of Buddha” (Lun fogu biao论佛骨表), in Han (1935, p. 333). Translated in de
Bary and Bloom (1999, vol. 1).
10 “The Source of the Way” (Yuandao 原道) in Han (1935, p. 131) (de Bary and Bloom 1999, p. 573);
“The Source of Humanity” (Yuanren 原人), in Han (1935, p. 133) (author’s translation).
11 Wang (1936, p. 607). For more on the ethnocentric strands in Confucianism co-existing with cross-
cultural learning and philosophical resources that could contribute to different cultures achieving mutual
understanding and peaceful interactions, see Tan (2005a).
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happiness or human flourishing, centered around the doctrine of autarkeia, self-
sufficiency emphasizing indifference to all things external and independence from
circumstances, including independence from political community. For Cynics, only
virtue (aretê) has intrinsic value and the cultivation of virtue is a personal quest.
They were generally dismissive of conventional politics and advocated following
the laws of nature instead of the conventional laws of the Greek cities. The true city
for the Cynic was an ideal community of Cynic sages sharing a way of life
regardless of geographical location. Cynic cosmopolitanism constitutes an impor-
tant part of Greek and Roman Stoicism which flourished between 300 BCE and
200 CE. A Cynic sage would acknowledge only another cynic sage as equal and
fellow cosmopolitan. The Cynics did not view everyone as the de facto member of a
universal community. The Cynic community of sages is a highly exclusive ideal. It
can be universalized only if all human beings successfully follow the Cynic way of
life, a highly speculative anarchist utopia which lies in a possible but improbable
future.
In Stoicism, cosmopolitanism transforms itself into the universal community of
common humanity. Instead of allegiance to a specific polis which defines one’s de
facto citizenship, Stoicism maintains that human beings owe allegiance to the entire
cosmos. Instead of restricting one’s good behavior to those who share one’s birth
place by accident, a fellow citizen in the restricted conventional sense, or those who
happen to share one’s particular characteristics or are associated with oneself in
particularistic relations, the Stoics treat all fellow human beings as equally
deserving of respect because of their common humanity. To behave ethically is to
promote the good of all humanity, not the good of some partial group at the expense
of another. Seneca (ca. 4 BCE–65 CE) considered each human being as belonging to
two communities,
the one, which is greatly and truly common, embracing gods and men, in
which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of
our citizenship by the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned
by the accident of our birth.”12
Epictetus (ca. 55–135 CE) considered all human beings “the children of Zeus,” and
as such sharing the divine characteristics of reason, which enable human beings to
participate in a community governed by divine laws. In Cicero’s (106–143 BCE)
account of cosmopolitanism, the world is a city ruled by divine laws, and human
beings together with gods are world-citizens because of their shared reason. A
supporter of the Roman Empire, Cicero believed that a benevolent empire could
bring about a political state on a world-wide scale that would realize this ideal. Not
everyone in the world worshipped Zeus or defined humanity by rationality; probably
only the Romans would accept as legitimate a world-state in the form of the Roman
Empire. The understanding of what is “universal” was not free from individual
Stoic’s particular social and historical perspectives, which now seem parochial and
ethnocentric from others’ perspectives.
12 De Otio 4.1, quoted in Sellars (2007, p. 1).
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The core belief of Roman Stoicism in reason and law as qualifying humanity for
a universal community bears a strong resemblance to the notion of the kingdom of
ends populated by free rational law-makers who obey their own laws in the moral
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Stoic cosmopolitanism also inspired Kant, whose
universalist moral viewpoint becomes the cosmopolitan perspective in his political
philosophy and philosophy of history. A political state is a union of people under
rightful law (Reiss 1991, p. 138). Law as coercive order is necessary because human
beings are imperfect and therefore do not always act as they ought, but instead often
fight among themselves and act in a violent and malevolent manner. Human
conflicts and the means to deal with those conflicts both arise from what Kant called
“the unsocial sociability of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society,
coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break
this society up” (Reiss 1991, p. 44). One key argument of modern cosmopolitanism
we owe to Kant is that the purpose of politics, to resolve human conflicts justly and
peacefully, if it is to be achieved at all, must be achieved on a world-wide scale.
For Kant, justice in a state requires “a constitution allowing the greatest possible
human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can
coexist with the freedom of the others” (Reiss 1991, p. 23). Kant’s emphasis on
reason and law not surprisingly goes with a belief that human beings have
inalienable rights, including freedom and equality. Having a perfect civil
constitution will not be enough to protect the rights of its citizens if a state is
threatened by the action of other states without such constitutions. States with
perfect civil constitutions will not go to war with one another, but those which treat
their people unjustly are likely to conduct wars of aggression even against peaceful
states. This makes the transition from war to peace a key political problem for Kant.
Perpetual peace is a requirement for universal justice. While Kant relied on
providence to guarantee perpetual peace, he also prescribed the political arrange-
ment that would lead us towards that goal: discarding the ideal of a world state as
unviable, he advocated a federation of states governed by rightful constitutions,
which will also regulate international relations according to rightful laws that they
agree to. Kant insisted that, even for his time,
The peoples of the earth has entered in varying degrees into a universal
community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one
part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is
therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the
unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a
universal right of humanity. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves
that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace. (Reiss 1991,
p. 108)
The influence of Immanuel Kant is still evident in the concerns of liberal
cosmopolitanism today, revolving around issues of global justice which have
become more pressing as the new global economy creates more inequalities both
within and across national boundaries, defending universal human rights and calling
renegade governments to account for their abuses, debating the need for global
democracy if there is to be democracy at all, agonizing over the right approach to
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the global threat of terrorism, criticizing the current institutions of international
relations and arguing for radical reforms in terms often reminiscent of Kant’s
cosmopolitan views. Such cosmopolitanism focuses its attention on the world stage,
and the boundaries of concern are those dividing nation-states. The moral
universalism associated with this Enlightenment legacy has come under strong
criticism. This is partly because historically what has been offered as “universal” is
now considered merely Eurocentric, and worse, it has been tainted by being used to
justify colonialism as a mission of “civilization.”13 In practice, universalism has
shown a dangerous tendency towards uniformitarian intolerance for differences,
which could poison cosmopolitanism even in the postcolonial era. Its hostility to
particularistic affiliations, partial sentiments, and special responsibilities to signif-
icant others, also leads to the criticism that universalist cosmopolitanism values
humanity only in the abstract; it is untenable in its failure to take seriously “the
value of particular human lives, the lives people have made for themselves, within
the communities that help lend significance to those lives” (Appiah 2005, pp. 222–
223).
Martha Nussbaum attempts to rescue liberal cosmopolitanism from Enlighten-
ment universalism by drawing on a more ancient source. Her interpretation of Stoic
cosmopolitanism attempts to render less stark the opposition between the universal
and the particular, for a more positive tension between the two, so that being a
cosmopolitan in the Stoic sense does not mean rejecting the particular in favor of the
universal, or abandoning local identifications and affiliations. Valuing one’s
identifications and affiliations does not entail that some particular individuals or
groups are more worthwhile than other human beings, even to oneself, but rather
recognizes that “it makes sense for me to do my duties where I am placed, that the
human community is best arranged in this way” (Nussbaum 1997, p. 9). This
argument that the special attention and concern for the local and particular simply is
the most sensible way to do the most good universally is one way liberal
cosmopolitans have responded to the challenge of taking ethical partiality seriously.
Appiah (2005, p. 216) takes a similar line.
It is because humans live best on a smaller scale that liberal cosmopolitans
should acknowledge the ethical salience of not just the state and the county,
the town, the street, the business, the craft, the profession, the family as
communities, as circles among the many circles narrower than the human
horizon that are appropriate spheres of moral concern. …
To contemplate cosmopolitanism of this variety is to contemplate the task of
cosmopolitanism, which is debate and conversations across nations.
Appiah (2005, p. 256) himself defends a “rooted cosmopolitanism” which is “a form
of universalism that is sensitive to the ways in which historical context may shape
the significance of a practice”; rooted cosmopolitanism is not a “dialogue among
static closed cultures, each of which is internally homogeneous and different from
all others; not a celebration of a collection of closed boxes.” Indeed, Appiah does
13 Coleman and Higgings (2000). Stoic cosmopolitans were straightforward in their support for
colonialism (Nussbaum 1997, p. 14).
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not even want to talk about cultures. For him, “cultural differences” is not the best
description of what divides or unites neighbors and nations. However we describe
those differences, conversation is one way of bridging them. According to Appiah
(2005, p. 257), cosmopolitan conversations do not depend on shared beliefs or
common capacity for reason; instead what makes cosmopolitan experience possible
is “the grasp of a narrative logic that allows us to construct the world to which our
imaginations respond.” This creative tension between universality and particularity,
evident in the history of Western cosmopolitanism itself is significant for attempts to
construct Confucian cosmopolitanism which requires a balance between universal-
ity and particularity.
Given the Western origins of cosmopolitanism, does Confucian cosmopolitanism
mean imposing Western conceptual categories on Confucianism? Wholesale
adoption of ancient Greek or Roman conceptual frameworks, or Enlightenment
philosophical theories and political commitments will not yield a viable Confucian
cosmopolitanism. This exercise does require borrowing some Western conceptual
tools, but using them in a different cultural context will also transform them, even as
their use transforms Confucianism. Confucian cosmopolitanism therefore cultural-
ize cosmopolitanism in a particular way; it also modernizes Confucianism by
drawing on the resources of cosmopolitan traditions to reconstruct Confucian
philosophy for contemporary living; it resists a revival that hankers after the past
which tends to be painted in rosy colors, obscuring the undesirable aspects of
historical traditions. In reconstructing Confucianism to include a Confucian
cosmopolitanism, admitting historical ethnocentrism is the first step to reminding
today’s Confucians to guard against similar prejudices, while availing themselves of
elements in Confucian philosophy which could contribute to the daily practices of a
cosmopolitan. It is an attempt to join the conversation about what it means today to
be a “citizen of the world” from different cultural perspectives, and how to live a
cosmopolitan life on a day to day basis.
Cosmopolitan tendencies in contemporary Confucianism
The claim that a Confucian cosmopolitanism is possible must be qualified to avoid
misleading conclusions. Given their different philosophical psychologies, the
Confucian conception of de is not identical to the Cynic conception of arête
(although both are often translated as “virtue”). Confucianism as a world philosophy
with followers living in different parts of the world may in one sense parallel the
Cynic cosmopolitan ideal of a community of Cynic sages sharing a way of life
regardless of geographical location, but Confucians would not treat all places or all
communities with the same equality that Cynics, and later the Stoics, would treat
fellow cosmopolitans. While their care and concern could reach out infinitely to
other Confucians and even non-Confucians as fellow humans worldwide, there is
ethical gradation in care and concern for different persons and communities.
A Confucian could care for all under heaven, but not equally or in the same way
since some persons are related more closely to oneself in ways that generate
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differential ethical responsibilities towards such particular others.14 Unlike liberal
cosmopolitans, Confucians would consider it irrelevant to insist on “equal worth”
once it is admitted that those most closely related to us have priority in our ethical
consideration.15 The universal inclusiveness of Confucian cosmopolitanism will be
accompanied by a high degree of differentiation that takes particularities of specific
situations into account.
Some scholars who contrast Confucianism as a philosophy emphasizing the
particular, even the parochial, with the universalistic drives in traditional Western
philosophical thinking insist that “all under heaven (tianxia 天下)” does not mean
“the world” for Confucians; it had been mostly limited to actual places of their
experience. Without detracting from the significance of Confucian emphasis on the
particular, the concrete in experience, which kept them from abstract universalism,
nor denying that some Confucians had been guilty of ethnocentrism of their own,
we do Confucianism an injustice if we do not acknowledge that the philosophy has
intellectual horizons beyond what Confucians actually experienced, and that it could
be understood to advocate a vision of an ideal world of cultivated exemplary
persons living in harmonious communities, which are not limited to only the actual
territories Confucians have hitherto known or considered “civilized.” As Confu-
cians’ knowledge of what lies “under heaven” expanded over the generations, the
Confucian moral vision could and should expand to correspond with their expanded
world. Historically, the spread of Confucianism from China to other parts of East
Asia, notably Korea, Japan and Vietnam, and its lasting influence in those countries
testifies to its potential as a mobile and expansive, universalizable tradition. If
Confucius thought that he could live among the Yi clans and at least retain his own
virtuous ways, if not influence them with his exemplary practices, then his followers
today could live anywhere in the world and still aim to remain committed to the
ways of Confucius.
Although Chinese intellectual history did not replicate the exact opposition
between the universal and the particular which underlies the history of cosmopoli-
tanism, there is a tension between what could be considered cosmopolitan
Confucian aspiration of helping everyone practice de so that dao would prevail in
the whole world—no one is excluded from its moral vision—and the ethnocentrism
implicit in Confucius’ understanding of his moral mission in terms of “this culture”
(siwen 斯文) passed on by the legendary Chinese sage- kings (Analects 9.5). The
“conversion” of non-Chinese tribes which invaded China itself and established the
Yuan and the Qing dynasties is highly significant for Confucianism’s claim to
potentially universal transformative power which has little to do with coercion.
However, if mishandled, Confucian aspiration could also fall prey to universalistic
ethnocentrism. For example, if the spread of Confucianism to places such as Korea,
14 Confucians were criticized for not “loving everyone impartially” by Mozi, who lived in the fourth
century BCE. For a discussion of that debate, see Van Norden (2003). See also discussions of Confucian
extension of ethical consideration in an expanding circle of “graduated love” in Tan (2004, pp. 72–74),
Tu Wei-ming’s and Roger T. Ames’s contributions in Ames et al. (1994, pp. 181–182, 204–207).
15 This does not mean that any kind of inequalities would be acceptable to Confucians, but the Confucian
view of equality as a value is a complex issue that this paper cannot take up fully; for a discussion of
Confucianism and equality, see Tan (2016).
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Japan and Vietnam is seen as a process of “civilizing” otherwise barbaric peoples,
especially if the influence was not due to exemplary virtue but to military might of
imperial China, then the Confucian “cosmopolitan ideal” of “bringing peace to all
under heaven (ping tianxia 平天下)” is no less imperialistic and ethnocentric than
European colonialism. That imperial China had treated these outlying regions as
“tributary states” and no doubt saw itself in a “civilizing role,” without being in
anyway self-conscious or apologetic about its ethnocentrism, is a historical legacy
that, coupled with current geopolitics, makes many in East Asia uneasy at any
mention of a “tianxia” system if it implies Chinese domination in any way. While
these concerns of realpolitik should not be dismissed, we should also consider the
spread of Confucianism from the perspective of social interactions of non-state
actors: historically the degree to which Confucianism came to characterize East
Asian societies could not be entirely credited to the coercive power of colonial or
neo-colonial relations with China.16
The same tension between the universal and the particular remains in the
aspirations of contemporary Confucians such as Tu Wei-ming, who on the one hand
claimed that Confucianism is quintessential “Chineseness,” yet on the other hand
proclaimed its global relevance as a kind of cosmopolitan humanism. Addressing
the challenges of globalization, Tu Wei-ming (Tu 1992, p. 339) observes that the
“conceptual framework informed by the exclusive dichotomy of universalism and
particularism” gives rise to a kind of “schizophrenia.”
If we insist upon an either-or choice between global consciousness and local
commitment, we—self-styled cosmopolitan citizens of the world under the
influence of Enlightenment mentality—are prone to condemn all alien forms
of quests for roots as narrow-minded and dangerous particularisms. Curiously,
at the same time, our own commitment to ethnicity, gender, mother tongue,
fatherland, class, and faith often compels us to take radically exclusivist
position despite our avowed cosmopolitanism.
Tu believes that the Confucian golden rule, and the related glossing of general virtue
of humanity (ren 仁) in terms of “wishing to establish oneself, one establishes
others; wishing to enlarge oneself, one enlarges others,” could transform the
contradictions between global consciousness and local commitment into “an
intimate mutuality.”17
Tu’s works have borrowed creatively from other cultures, even as they promote
Confucianism, while contributing to inquiries that cut across cultural boundaries.
For Tu (1984, p. 80, 1998a, XXVII), despite Confucianism being part of “the
psycho-cultural construct of the contemporary Chinese intellectual as well as the
Chinese peasant,” its identification with “Chineseness” does not prevent Confu-
cianism from contributing meaningfully “to the cultivation of cultural competence,
ethical intelligence, and spiritual values of young people East and West.” In the
16 It might be argued that this is true of other imperialistic colonial powers as well. However, it is not
necessary for my purpose here to judge which colonization was more pernicious or contemptible.
17 Analects 6.30, 12.2, 15.24. Chan (1963, pp. 14–18) translates ren as ‘humanity’ and considers it the
general virtue that is the source of all specific Confucian virtues; see also Chan (1975).
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“third Epoch of Confucian Humanism” envisioned by Tu Wei-ming, Confucians
would be exemplary world citizens, whose cultural accomplishments are compre-
hensible to other cultures and respectful of them. Such cosmopolitan Confucianism
would also contribute to the core values of a “fiduciary global community” (Tu
1992, p. 343).18 And cosmopolitan Confucians, “as citizens of the global
community, maintain the universality of human rights…profess the desirability of
democracy as providing to this day the most effective framework in which human
rights are safeguarded.”19
Robert C. Neville’s “Boston Confucianism” offers us insights into how Tu’s ideal
of a global community of exemplary world citizens is realized from below, at the
most basic level of day-to-day interpersonal encounters. Unlike Tu who emphasized
the presence of cosmopolitan values in Confucianism, their incorporation into or
their complementing Confucian philosophy, Neville (2000, pp. 15–23) highlights
the function and power of rituals (li) in Confucianism and uses the notion to critique
Boston society and suggest ways of civilizing its day-to-day interactions. By
generalizing Confucian li to include “the entire pyramid of signs or of organic and
social habits,” he argues that Confucianism could help Boston develop certain
meaningful significatory forms—ritual forms of family, friendship, and civility—to
shape social habits to improve its family, working, social, and civic life (Neville
2000, p. 14). The mobility and expansiveness of the tradition may testify to its
global relevance or potential, without being necessarily cosmopolitan in the sense
that a “citizen of the world” would not confine her loyalty to a community fixed in
location, but would recognize as her fellow citizens anyone anywhere in the world
who adheres to the same philosophical vision in practice. While this is not a
question addressed directly by Neville, Confucian rituals might have a role to play
in building cosmopolitan communities via the search for global civil society. Rituals
have been at the center of discussions of civility among scholars of Confucianism.
Ritual forms of civility govern how individuals relate to and play official and semi-
official roles in their community. The theme of civility has received some attention
in recent civil society discourse from Confucian perspectives, and others have
argued that instead of imposing a new world order through top-down globalization,
we should aim for global civil society, or focus on transnational communities and
social movements that involve individuals on an everyday basis in nurturing global
citizenship.20 The allegiance of members of global civil society and transnational
movements would be cosmopolitan, and their success would depend on skills and
excellences which are “portable” as well as effective in bridging cultural and other
differences that otherwise divide people from different parts of the world.
18 See also a similar assertion of centrality of Confucianism to Chinese culture and its relevance to global
ethics in the works of another third-generation new Confucian, Liu (2001).
19 Unpublished text of the 1995 Inaugural Wu Teh Yao Memorial Lecture in Singapore, p. 5; most of it
has been published in Tu (1998b). On “the third Epoch of Confucian Humanism,” see Tu (1993, chap. 8).
See also more detailed discussion of Tu’s portrayal of contemporary Confucians as “exemplary world
citizens” in Tan (2005b, pp. 186–190).
20 For Confucian perspective on civil society, see Rouner (2000, pp. 187–221), Tan (2003). On global
civil society, see Falk (1993), Delanty (2000, pp. 58–64).
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Confucian Li in the Chinese diaspora as cosmopolitan cultural practice
Neville’s emphasis on Confucian li in his discussion of Confucianism as a “portable
tradition” provides an important lead in the search for concrete cultural practices
that keep an overseas Chinese community together as a distinctive cultural entity,
but at the same time enable it to adapt to globalization in the modern era. The
Chinese have prided themselves on their “kingdom of rites and ceremonies (liyi zhi
bang 禮儀之邦).” Li distinguished the Chinese from the barbarians in the regions
surrounding the states of the central plains between the Yellow River and the
Yangtze. “The central states are the states of ritual propriety (liyi 禮義)” (He 1931,
Duke Yin 7th year). Contemporary Chinese scholars acknowledged the ethnocentric
bias in such attitudes and emphasized that the non-Chinese tribes, many of which
are now part of the political entity of the PRC, also have their own li even if they
may not use that term to describe those practices. “Li was also culture; Chinese li
distinguished Chinese from other ethnic groups, each of which had its own li”
(Ebrey 1991, p. 14; see also Chen 1991, pp. 57–64).
Confucian li may be “distinctively Chinese mechanisms for achieving social and
cultural cohesion,” nevertheless their function bears close resemblance to the rituals
studied by Western social scientists (Ebrey 1991, p. 7). Hermeneutical study of
Confucian texts to grasp the meaning of li in the Confucian tradition, as well as
study what it means in practice could be combined with contemporary anthropo-
logical and other social science perspectives of ritual as cultural practices central to
the making of community. For example, Lincoln (1989, p. 53) argues that ritual is
“an authoritative mode of symbolic discourse and a powerful instrument for the
evocation of those sentiments (affinity and estrangement) out of which society is
constructed.”21 Ritual plays an important role in sustaining human communities,
and some see its loss as a critical contributing factor to various forms of social
pathology and individual psychological malfunction. Some argue that rituals are
necessary and inevitable phenomena in any culture (Rappaport 1971; Geertz 1973,
pp. 92–93; Mahdi et al. 1996). They are means of setting up distinctions within a
community, as well as marking the boundaries between insiders and outsiders. They
also serve semiotic or communicative functions facilitating and differentiating
social interactions. Julian Huxley used “ritualization” to denote “adaptive formal-
ization and canalization of motivated human activities so as to secure more effective
communicatory (‘signaling’) function, reduction of intra-group damage, or better
intra-group bonding.” Ritual is a way of mobilizing individuals “as self-regulating
participants in social encounters” (Huxley 1966, p. 258; see also Goffman 1967,
pp. 44 and 54; Rappaport 1971, p. 63). As an important part of human interaction,
relevant across cultures, ritual has been defined as conventional acts of display
21 A quick scan uncovers articles such as “Art and Ritual as Method of Social Control and Planning”
(Ethics); “Ritual as a Mechanism for Urban Adaptation” (Man); “Topical Talk, Ritual and Social
Organization of Relationships” (Social Psychology Quarterly); “Ritual in Family Living” (American
Sociological Review); “Children and Civility: Ceremonial Deviance and Acquisition of Ritual
Competence” (Social Psychology Quarterly); “The Language and Ritual of Socialization: Birthday
Parties in a Kindergarten Context” (Man).
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through which one or more participants communicate information concerning
themselves.
Rituals may be ubiquitous in all cultures, but in no other cultures is it as highly
developed as li, or as prominent and pervasive as li in every aspect of Chinese
civilization throughout its history, from philosophy to political system and
bureaucracy, to mundane every day activities. Confucius did not invent the idea
or the practice. The term li (禮)—variously translated as “rites,” “rituals,”
“ceremony,” “ritual action,” “ritual propriety,” “propriety,” “decorum,” “manners”
“courtesy,” and “civility”—initially referred to religious ceremonies and rituals.
Ancient texts and other archeological discoveries provide evidence that, from very
early in their history, the Chinese performed rituals for sacrifice and divination for
various major events, funerals and mourning, as well as rituals for preparation and
conclusion of war, and other military ceremonies, for forming of alliances, paying
of tribute and various diplomatic transactions between separate political entities, for
banquets, farming and hunting, to mark entry into adulthood, and marriage. The
term li also referred to the classifications and rules of the clan and bureaucratic
institutions. There were hundreds and thousands of different kinds of li of varying
importance.22 It is not surprising that special expertise developed and became
necessary to ensure the proper conduct of such ceremonies and rituals. Confucius
and his followers, the ru, were such experts on li.
Information gleaned from the early texts and pieced together from archeological
discoveries pertains mainly to the li of the ruling and aristocratic class. There is in
fact an explicit statement about its social exclusiveness: “Rituals do not extend
down to the common people; corporal punishments do not extend up to the grand
ministers.”23 The statement is not so much denying that the common people have
social norms which structure and facilitate interaction as denying them a certain
form of excellence which came to be identified with li. Through their philosophical
reflection on the nature, purpose, value, and functioning of li, Confucius and his
followers generalized the normativity of li so that the idea became one of human
excellence rather than aristocratic excellence.
Parrots can talk yet remain birds; gorillas can speak, yet remain beasts. Now if
humans yet have no li, even though they can speak, do they not also have the
heart-minds of beasts?
… Hence sages created li to teach people in order that, by their having li,
humans may themselves to be different from beasts. (Sun 1989, 1:10–11)
In the Analects, li regulates human relations, from those in the family (Analects 2.5)
to that between ruler and subject (Analects 3.18, 3.19). It enables one to take one’s
place in the community (Analects 16.13) and its chief value lies in promoting
22 According to the Book of Rites (Sun 1989, 2:651), “Primary rituals number three hundred; secondary
rituals three thousand.” Author’s translation.
23 Book of Rites (Sun 1989, 1:81–82). Similar to the exclusion of “barbarians,” this exclusion of the
lower classes has been rejected by contemporary studies. Han dynasty scholar, Zheng Xuan (127–200 CE)
already clarified that it was the common people’s lack of time and material resources which prevented
them from observing all the ritual details. See Chen (1991, pp. 36–42). However, it remains true that we
know almost nothing about the li of the common people of that early period.
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harmony (Analects 1.12). It is essential to ideal government (Analects 2.3) and
governs every aspect of a cultivated person’s life. It is the constitutive means to
ideal humanity (ren).
Yan Hui inquired about authoritative conduct (ren 仁). The Master replied,
“Through self-discipline and observing ritual propriety (li 禮) one becomes
authoritative in one’s conduct.”
…
Yan Hui said, “Could I ask what becoming authoritative entails?” The Master
replied, “Do not look at anything that violates the observance of ritual
propriety; do not listen to anything that violates the observance of ritual
propriety; do not speak anything that violates the observance of ritual
propriety; do not do anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety.”
(Analects 12.1)
In the contemporary context, one might argue that unless there are appropriate
Confucian rituals to realize ideals such as ren or yi, Confucianism could not be
revived—for it is not supposed to be merely armchair philosophy or ideology—
otherwise it would be no more than what historian Yu Ying-shih (1997, p. 32) calls
a “wandering spirit” (youhun 游魂).
Chapter 10 of the Analects portrays Confucius in various ritual performances.
According to Eno (1990, p. 7), the Analects contain “not merely instructive sayings
of the Master but inter-subjectively validated ideas, communal values exemplified
by life experiences of the speakers in the act of li” (see also Tu 1985, p. 83). Instead
of a body of doctrine, early followers of Confucius primarily constituted a
community through their ritual activity. While philosophically Confucians
contended with other schools during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States
period, they were defeated politically by Legalists during the reign of the First
emperor who allegedly had Confucian scholars buried and Confucian texts burned.
During the Han dynasty, emperors turned to Chinese scholars with knowledge of
texts which came to be associated with a retrospectively constructed ru lineage to
devise new political rituals for the imperial court as well as operate the
administrative machinery inherited from the Legalist state. Over the centuries,
Chinese scholars edited and provided detailed commentaries and expositions of
Confucian ritual classics such as the Yi Li and the Li Ji, and they wrote new manuals
from imperial ritual codes to private etiquette books, all of which shaped the
performance of rituals from early imperial times (Ebrey 1991, chap. 2). There is no
denying that li is central to Confucianism and its strongest link with Chinese
society.
Right up to the modern period, the traditional Chinese social order was
characterized as Confucian ritual order (Fei 1992; Ch’u¨ 1961). Lin (2001, p. 187)
identifies social ritual as one of three types of social control in traditional China—
the other two being the powerful state machinery and the kinship group—
interwoven into a comprehensive power structure to obtain maximum social
conformity. Over time, li became identified with traditional and conventional “rules
of conduct.” As such, li rigidified over time. It was as rigid rules of conduct that
“ritual doctrines” (lijiao 禮教) became oppressive and came under attack by the
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May Fourth intellectuals. Lu Xun (1990) equated it with “cannibalism” in his Diary
of a Madman. This is a degradation rather than a realization of the idea representing
one of the key moral achievements in Confucius’ teachings. Confucian li is better
understood as valued cultural norms of various day to day activities and practices,
which facilitate social interaction, promote solidarity and harmony, which have
stood the test of time but are not unchangeable.
A survey of the practices through the ages shows that rituals do change.
Philosophically, change is permitted and even considered desirable at times, even
though some changes should be resisted.
The Master said, “The use of a hemp cap is prescribed in the observance of
ritual propriety (li禮). Nowadays, that a silk cap is used instead is a matter of
frugality. I would follow accepted practice on this. A subject kowtowing on
entering the hall is prescribed in the observance of ritual propriety (li 禮).
Nowadays one kowtows only after ascending the hall is a matter of hubris.
Although it goes contrary to accepted practice, I still kowtow on entering the
hall.” (Analects 9.3)
We no longer follow the above ritual form of entering someone’s residence, but it
does not mean any manner of entry is acceptable; the li might have changed, but
swaggering into another’s home without so much as a “hello” or wearing shoes for
the outdoors into Chinese homes would definitely transgress ritual propriety. Few
Chinese children still follow the ritual actions recommended in the traditional ritual
texts, such as help their parents out of bed, make the preparations for them to wash
up, ask if they are warm enough, massage their limbs, prepare their breakfasts, and
so on (Sun 1989, 2:728–729). However, filial children would still have their own set
of ritual actions when it comes to showing concern for and taking care of their
parents. Some rituals of banquets (e.g. wedding banquets) and festival gatherings—
regarding forms of invitations, welcoming guests, seating arrangements, kinds of
food served, activities such as toasting and encouraging guests to drink—still
survive and other rituals are modified to various extents. How have some of these
rituals been modified or new rituals evolved when social interactions involve people
from different cultures, or take place in different settings created by new
globalization processes?
In a new era of globalization, Confucians must adapt their li to new
circumstances, to novel social interactions in encounters with multiple cultural
others. A study of the cultural transformation in overseas Chinese communities,
with regard to their adaptation and changing understanding of li could enlighten us
about how to go about building cosmopolitan cultures, through successful
adaptation to retain cultural identity while opening the community to harmonious
interaction with other cultural communities, to value the particularistic relations of
those most closely related to oneself while extending one’s concern in a
cosmopolitan orientation. This would require inter-disciplinary studies that go
beyond the scope of this paper.
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